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ABSTRACT
Talek is a private group messaging system that sends messages
through potentially untrustworthy servers, while hiding both data
content and the communication patterns among its users. Talek
explores a new point in the design space of private messaging; it
guarantees access sequence indistinguishability, which is among
the strongest guarantees in the space, while assuming an anytrust
threat model, which is only slightly weaker than the strongest
threat model currently found in related work. Our results suggest
that this is a pragmatic point in the design space, since it supports
strong privacy and good performance: we demonstrate a 3-server
Talek cluster that achieves throughput of 9,433 messages/second for
32,000 active users with 1.7-second end-to-end latency. To achieve
its security goals without coordination between clients, Talek relies
on information-theoretic private information retrieval. To achieve
good performance and minimize server-side storage, Talek intro-
duces new techniques and optimizations thatmay be of independent
interest, e.g., a novel use of blocked cuckoo hashing and support for
private notifications. The latter provide a private, efficient mech-
anism for users to learn, without polling, which logs have new
messages.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Messaging applications depend on cloud servers to exchange data,
giving server operators full visibility into the communication pat-
terns between users. Even if the communication contents are en-
crypted, network metadata can be used to infer which users share
messages, when traffic is sent, where data is sent, and how much is
transferred. This can allow the servers and/or network providers
to infer the contents of the communication [53]. When remote
hacking, insider threats, and government requests are common,
protecting the privacy of communications requires that we guaran-
tee security against a stronger threat model. For some users, e.g.,
journalists and activists, protecting metadata is critical to their job
function and safety [68, 69].
As we describe in §10, a wide variety of systems explore ways
of protecting the privacy of such metadata. We can classify this
prior work into two groups based on the privacy guarantees of-
fered and the threat model each system defends against. The first
group of work [8–10, 19, 46, 47, 50, 72] offers strong security guar-
antees against very strong threat models (e.g., assuming that only
the clients themselves are trusted). Unfortunately, this typically
imposes prohibitive computational or network costs. The second
group [2, 4, 28, 29, 31, 58–60, 63, 76, 79, 87, 89, 90] offers weaker
security guarantees (such as k-anonymity [85], plausible deniabil-
ity [52] or differential privacy [39, 40]) and often much weaker
threat models too; e.g., a fraction of the servers must be honest.
However, in exchange for weakening the guarantees and threat
model, these systems often achieve impressive performance results.
In this work, we explore an intriguing middle ground: we define
access sequence indistinguishability, a notion similar to (but slightly
stronger than) the security guarantees from systems in the first
group, and combine it with an “anytrust” threat model [91], which
is slightly weaker than the threat models of the first group, but
stronger than those of the second group. Intuitively, the anytrust
threat model assumes that different organisations, e.g., Mozilla, EFF,
and WikiLeaks, each provide servers and at least one (unknown)
organisation can be trusted. The hope is that we can promise the
strong guarantees of the first group and the strong performance of
the second, while defending against a strong threat model.
To explore this design point, we construct Talek, a private com-
munication system targeting small groups of trusted users com-
municating amongst themselves (e.g., friends chatting via IRC or
text messaging). To support such applications, Talek offers the ab-
straction of a private log with a single writer and multiple readers.
Clients store and retrieve asynchronous messages on untrusted
servers without revealing any communication metadata. If the
group of friends and at least one server are uncompromised, Talek
prevents an adversary from learning anything about their commu-
nication patterns. Combined with standard message encryption,
Talek conceals both the contents andmetadata of clients’ application
usage without sacrificing cloud reliability and availability.
Similar to prior systems, to hide communication patterns, Talek
clients issue fix-sized, random-looking network requests at a rate
which is independent of application-level requests. Hence, application-
level requests must occasionally be delayed, and “dummy” network
requests must be issued when no application requests are ready.
As with any privacy system, careful application-specific tuning is
necessary to trade off between the amount of cover traffic sent and
the latency of real application requests.
Unlike prior systems with Talek’s strong guarantees, to achieve
good performance, Talek leverages the anytrust threat model, which
allows us to use information theoretic private information retrieval
(IT-PIR) [27, 35, 45]. IT-PIR requires an anytrust assumption, but
in exchange it avoids the use of heavyweight crypto operations
required for other flavors of PIR [57]. Abstractly, PIR allows a client
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to retrieve the i-th record from a “database” of n items held col-
lectively by l servers, without the servers learning which record
was retrieved. However, PIR alone (of any flavor) is not enough to
support efficient group messaging. In particular, it does not explain
how messages are privately written to the servers, how readers find
messages sent to them, nor how to structure the PIR database to
facilitate maximum efficiency.
In Talek, within a group of clients reading and writing to a mes-
sage log, a shared secret determines a pseudorandom, deterministic
sequence of database locations for messages. Any user with the
log secret (a capability) can follow the pseudorandom sequence,
reading new messages independently. These secrets may be shared
through in-band control logs. One of Talek’s key innovations is to
show how these messages can be stored in a blocked cuckoo hash
table [36] to provide efficient time and space usage in the context
of IT-PIR. We further optimize read performance via a novel tech-
nique - private notifications. Private notifications allow users who
subscribe to multiple logs to learn, in a privacy-preserving fashion,
which of their logs have new messages. Hence, they can internally
prioritize reading from those logs and avoid inefficient polling of
logs that have no new messages.
Like any privacy system, Talek has several limitations. First, the
current implementation of Talek does not guarantee liveness; any
user in a trusted group can blockwrites to that group’s log. Similarly,
a faulty server can impact availability. Clients can detect but not
attribute such faults. Hence, service providers should be chosen
with reputations for high availability. An alternative is to use robust
versions of PIR [35, 45] at the cost of higher overhead. We defer
investigating this option to future work. Second, because clients
connect directly to Talek servers, as with other practical systems [9,
10, 58–61, 87, 89], we do not hide when users are online. Orthogonal
systems (e.g., Tor [37]) may help here. Third, as discussed earlier,
we expect Talek to be used for communication among small groups
of trusted users. If a log secret is shared with the adversary, writer
anonymity for that log is compromised, but readers’ anonymity
and writer anonymity for other logs are preserved. Applications
that require broadcasts to many untrusted users (e.g., a public blog)
are better served by anonymous broadcast systems [28, 29, 31, 90].
We have implemented two versions of Talek, one entirely in Go
and one that offloads PIR operations to a GPU; our code is publicly
available. We evaluated the system on a 3-server deployment using
Amazon EC2. To provide a realistic group messaging workload, we
replay the Ubuntu IRC message logs from 2016 [3]. Overall, we find
that this design point is surprisingly practical. Even with 32,000
clients actively reading and writing messages according to a fixed
schedule every second, we show that clients use 148MB per day
to achieve an average end-to-end message latency of 1.7 seconds,
measured from the time a sender enters a message to the time
the recipient sees it. Under this workload, our server supports a
peak throughput of 9,433 messages per second, orders of magnitude
better performance than systems with similar security goals.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
• Talek, a system that explores an important design point within
private group messaging with strong guarantees, strong threat
model, and high performance.
• A novel use of blocked cuckoo hashing for IT-PIR.
• Private notifications which privately encode the set of new mes-
sages, helping clients prioritize reads.
• Two open-source implementations of Talek exploring the tradeoffs
between CPU and GPU-based computation.
2 BACKGROUND: PIR
Talek uses the privacy guarantees of PIR in the context of a group
messaging protocol. PIR allows a single client to retrieve a block
from a set of storage replicas without revealing to any server the
blocks of interest to the client. There exist two major categories of
PIR techniques, computational PIR (C-PIR) [57] and information-
theoretic PIR (IT-PIR) [27, 35, 45]. Talek is compatible with both
varieties. Prior work [9, 10] explored C-PIR, since it supports the
strongest possible threat model: only the communication partners
must be trusted. However, their results indicate that C-PIR imposes
significant computation and network overheads, raising practical-
ity concerns. With Talek, we focus on IT-PIR, which requires an
anytrust threat model but holds the promise of better performance.
To provide intuition for the performance and cost of IT-PIR, we
illustrate a standard protocol [27] with an example. Let l represent
the number of servers, each storing a full copy of the database,
partitioned into equal sized blocks. While IT-PIR generalizes to
arbitrary numbers of servers and blocks, our example contains
l = 3 servers and n = 3 blocks ({B1,B2,B3}).
(1) Suppose a client wants to read the second block, β = 2, encoded
by the bit vector, q′ = [0, 1, 0], which consists of zeros and a
one in position β .
(2) The client generates l − 1 (e.g., 2) random n-bit request vectors,
q1 and q2.
(3) The client computes the last request vector as the XOR of the
vectors from (1) and (2), ql = q′ ⊕ q1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ql−1.
(4) The client then sends qi , to server i for 1 ≤ i ≤ l . Since request
vectors are generated randomly, this reveals no information to
any collection of < l colluding servers.
(5) Suppose Bj represents the jth block of the database. Each server
i receives qi = [b1, . . . ,bn ] and computes Ri , the XOR of all Bj
for which bj == 1 and returns Ri to the client.
(6) The client restores the desired block, Bβ , by taking the XOR of
all Ri , i.e., Bβ = R1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Rl (since q′ = q1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ql , and q′
is all zeroes except at index β).
IT-PIR has desirable network properties: a client sends one re-
quest vector and receives one block from each server. These requests
and responses appear random to the network and the servers, as-
suming at least one server is honest. The size of a client request
scales with total number of blocks, and the client work scales with
the number of servers.
For the servers, IT-PIR can be computationally expensive even
though the individual operations (XOR) are cheap, since the compu-
tational cost for a read request scales at least linearly with the size
and number of blocks in the system. Theoretical work suggests this
limitation is inherent (§10). IT-PIR also requires consistent snap-
shots across servers, with equal sized blocks in the data structure.
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Figure 1: Talek’s System and Threat Model.We assume the adversary can control
all but one of l servers in the system (here, l = 3). Clients send network requests
directly to the servers. Adversarial servers are free to record additional data, such as
the source, type, parameters, timing, and size of all requests to link users who are
likely to be communicating together.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION & THREAT MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates our problem setting: various clients located
across a wide-area network communicate via a messaging service.
The service is provided by l servers each controlled by a different
administrative domain.
We wish to prevent the adversary from learning any information
about the communication patterns amongst honest users. While
not described in this paper, other end-to-end messaging guaran-
tees [88], such as message integrity, authentication [13, 78], forward
secrecy [6], and fork consistency [64, 66], can be provided by Talek
by including additional data in the message payload. We focus on
the privacy of access sequences, since that forms the foundation
for private messaging.
We define a model of client and server interactions (§3.1), and
then introduce access sequence indistinguishability (§3.2) to capture
the adversary’s inability to learn information about the communi-
cation between honest clients.
Access sequence indistinguishability provides one of the strongest
definitions of privacy available in private group messaging. It is
reminiscent of the definitions used in early works on oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [46, 47, 72], but it supports multiple distinct readers and
writers. It is stronger than k-anonymity [85], where the adversary
can narrow the user’s identity down to one of k users (where for
performance, k is typically much smaller than the number of on-
line users). It is also stronger than plausible deniability [52], where
information leakage is allowed up to a certain confidence bound.
It is different from unobservability [51], in that we do not hide
the maximum number of messages sent by the user, but we do
account for the order of the messages in the access sequences. It
is most similar to the notion of relationship unobservability under
explicit retrieval (UO-ER) [9, 10], which is based on the notion of
relationship unobservability [75]. We believe access sequence in-
distinguishability offers a cleaner definition, however, and differs
in at least two small, concrete ways:
(1) In UO-ER, at least one message is sent and received in each
round. In access sequence indistinguishability, the send and
receive rates are decoupled.
(2) In access sequence indistinguishability, the adversary is fully
adaptive, in the sense that the adversary can observe the net-
work events and modify its strategy in each round. In UO-ER,
each time the adversary adapts its strategy, the state of the
clients resets, which may reduce the adversary’s utility from
acting adaptively.
3.1 Model
Our setting consists of a finite set of servers and clients, and we
assume that all parties are stateful. The overall system consists of
the following, possibly randomized and interactive, subroutines:
RealWrite(τ , seqNo,M) → {ω0, . . . ,ωl−1}: Clients use the Real-
Write function to generate Write requests sent to the l servers. The
RealWrite function takes as input a log handle τ and a messageM
with the sequence number seqNo to publish to the log, producing
a set of l Write requests, one per server.
FakeWrite() → {ω0, . . . ,ωl−1}: Clients use the FakeWrite function
to generate a set of random “dummy”Write requests, one per server.
RealRead(τ , seqNo) → {q0, . . . ,ql−1}: Clients use the RealRead
function to generate Read request queries sent to the servers. It
takes as input a log handle τ and a sequence number seqNo in the
log, producing a set of l Read requests, one per server.
FakeRead() → {q0, . . . ,ql−1}: Clients use FakeRead to generate a
set of random Read requests, one per server.
GetUpdates() → V : Clients use the GetUpdates function (modeled
as an interactive subroutine) to retrieve the global interest vector,V ,
from the servers. The global interest vector encodes the set of (log
handle, message sequence number)-pairs for all messages currently
on the server.
ProcessWrite(ωi ) → ⊥: Server i uses the ProcessWrite function to
process an incoming write request, ωi , and update the server’s
internal state.
ProcessRead(qi ) → Ri : Server i uses the ProcessRead function to
process incoming read requests. The function takes as input a read
request, qi , and outputs a reply Ri .
ProcessGetUpdates() → V i : Server i uses ProcessGetUpdates to
generate a global interest vector, V i .
3.2 Security Game Definition
We define access sequence indistinguishability using the following
security game, played between the adversary, 𝒜 , and a challenger,
𝒞 . 𝒜 is a probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary who is in con-
trol of the network, t out of l servers (for Talek, t = l − 1), and
a polynomial number of clients. 𝒜 can drop any message, send
arbitrary messages from any of the adversarial clients to any server,
respond arbitrarily to requests, and modify any server-side state for
adversarial servers. The challenger, in turn, emulates (internally)
the honest clients and servers.
Intuitively, the game allows the adversary to repeatedly, dynam-
ically, and adaptively specify any two actions for each legitimate
client to take. The challenger has the client execute one of the two
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actions, based on the random bit b chosen for the game, and the
adversary can then choose new actions for the legitimate clients
and/or have its malicious clients and servers take actions. This
continues until the adversary produces a guess for the value of b. If
the adversary does no better than random chance, this implies that
the adversary cannot determine which users access the same logs,
because the adversary could have chosen to have client actions
with overlapping logs across users.
In the definition, for simplicity, we assume the presence of au-
thenticated secure channels between each client-server pair (e.g.,
with TLS) and omit the corresponding operations.
(1) 𝒜 chooses a non-negative integer,m, and submits this number
to the challenger, who spawnsm clients, 𝒞0 . . .𝒞m−1
(2) The challenger flips a coin, b ∈ {0, 1}, uniformly at random,
which is fixed for the duration of the game.
(3) For each of the challenger’s clients,𝒞j ,𝒜 maintains two unique
data access sequences, seq0j and seq
1
j .
(4) The challenger maintains a table T of log handles that have
been created. T is initially empty.
(5) In each round, until𝒜 ends the game, one of the following four
actions happens:
(a) 𝒜 creates a log
• 𝒜 submits a create log request to the challenger. This request
specifies the index of a client acting as a writer of the log,
and the indices of the clients acting as readers of the log.
• 𝒞 checks the client indices provided in the create log request,
and if all indices correspond to the clients spawned by the
challenger, 𝒞 generates a log handle τ . 𝒞 saves τ in T and
returns the corresponding index ind in T to the adversary.
(b) 𝒜 causes clients to GetUpdates
• 𝒜 identifies a set of clients I .
• Clients in I executeGetUpdates. Challenger-controlled servers
respond with ProcessGetUpdates.
(c) 𝒜 extends the access sequences
• For allm challenger clients,𝒜 chooses the i-th operation for
both sequences: {seq00[i] . . . seq0m−1[i]} and {seq10[i], . . . seq1m−1[i]}.
𝒜 submits operations seq0j [i] and seq1j [i] to the respective
client, 𝒞j . An operation can be (ind, RealWrite(·, seqNo,M)),
(ind, RealRead(·, seqNo)), FakeWrite(), or FakeRead(), where
ind is the index of the log handle for the request.
• Each client, 𝒞j , receives one operation: seqbj [i]. If it is a
FakeRead() or FakeWrite() operation, 𝒞j adds it to its read-
or write queue, respectively. Otherwise, the challenger looks
up the index ind in table T . If it finds the index and cor-
responding log handle τ , client 𝒞j sets the log handle of
seqbj [i] to τ and adds this updated operation to the read
queue if seqbj [i] is a RealRead, and to the write queue if it is
a RealWrite.
• If a write request must be issued this round (according to the
write ratew), each challenger client 𝒞j dequeues a request
from its write queue and executes it. If the write queue is
empty, 𝒞j executes a FakeWrite.
• If a read request must be issued this round (according to the
read rate r ), each challenger client 𝒞j dequeues a request
from its read queue and executes it. If the read queue is
empty, 𝒞j executes a FakeRead.
• Challenger-controlled servers use the ProcessRead and ProcessWrite
routines to respond to the corresponding requests.
• Adversary-controlled clients can send arbitrary requests to
any server. Adversary-controlled servers can modify their
own state and respond arbitrarily.
• 𝒜 observes the network events, eventsb′j [i] sent from 𝒞 ’s
clients to all servers, including the outputs of RealWrite,
FakeWrite, RealRead, and FakeRead.
(d) 𝒜 ends the game with its guess, b ′, for b.
Definition 3.1. (Access Sequence Indistinguishability) The sys-
tem provides access sequence indistinguishability with security
parameter λ if for any polynomial-time probabilistic adversary
|Pr (b = b ′) − 1/2| ≤ neдl(λ)
in the security game, where neдl is a negligible function.
In the game, when the adversary asks to create a log, we restrict
the members of the group to honest clients, which corresponds
directly to the trusted group assumption. We do not hide retrievals
of the global interest vector via GetUpdates, but we do hide the
fact that a user of a trusted group is executing a real read or write
request. In Talek, t = l − 1, since this corresponds to the anytrust
threat model.
Availability. Threats to availability are out of scope for this pa-
per. During normal operation, all servers must be available and
reachable by the clients. Each server can deny service availability
by refusing to respond or by responding with faulty information.
However, the application developer and clients can detect (though
not attribute) such faulty behavior. We assume developers will
choose services known for availability. While we do not discuss it
in this paper, Byzantine fault tolerant variations of private informa-
tion retrieval [35, 45] can be used for better availability guarantees
at the cost of higher overhead. Adversarial clients can also degrade
service through denial-of-service attacks.
Intersection attacks. An ideal private messaging system would
make an honest user’s actions perfectly indistinguishable from
all other honest users actions. Even such a perfect system would
still have its limitations; for example, if only two honest users ever
participate, then an attacker can infer that those two users are likely
to be communicating with each other.
In practice, most private messaging systems do not achieve ideal
hiding; instead they hide a user’s actions with a smaller anonymity
set, e.g., the set of all online users, or online writers, or even a
smaller subset thereof. These compromises aremade due to practical
constraints or the desire for better performance. For example, if
users are allowed to go offline without causing the rest of the
system to stop functioning, then the anonymity set of any active
user is necessarily reduced to only those users active at the same
time. Since these anonymity sets change over time (e.g., based on
when users come online), users may be vulnerable to intersection
attacks [33, 56, 67] in which the adversary observes a particular
user’s anonymity sets over time, and, by intersecting those sets,
narrows down the user’s overall anonymity set.
Talek provably provides access sequence indistinguishability,
but, as with most private messaging systems [9, 10, 58–61, 87, 89],
4
Talek: Private Group Messaging with Hidden Access Patterns , ,
for practical reasons Talek allows users to go offline. As a result, an
honest user is hidden amongst all honest online users. This offers
stronger privacy than systems based on k-anonymity. In such sys-
tems, for performance reasons, k is typically set to be much smaller
than the set of all online users (e.g., k might be the number of users
actively writing in a round). Furthermore, in each round of com-
munication, the chosen set of k users may vary, which means the
adversary has many opportunities to perform intersection attacks
on these small sets.
3.3 Assumptions
To provide access sequence indistinguishability, Talek relies on
several assumptions. We assume that server storage capacity is
scaled to the number of clients. We assume that communicating
clients already know each others’ long-term public keys. Talek is
compatible with bootstrapping keys from other applications [5, 34]
or identity-based encryption [16, 17, 62]. We assume each server
has a public-private key pair, pk, sk , generated using an algorithm
PKGen(), and that all server public keys are known to all users. Es-
tablishing such keys is orthogonal to the properties Talek provides.
As with prior work [9, 10], Talek supports groups of mutually
trusting users. We assume users communicating together trust each
other to protect shared secrets. If this trust is misplaced, the writer’s
anonymity may be lost, but PIR still preserves reader anonymity.
4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section, we give a brief overview of Talek’s key design
decisions. Later, we present Talek’s core operations more formally
and in greater detail (§5), followed by two optimizations to improve
read performance: serialized PIR (§6) and private notifications (§7).
Talek’s core abstraction is a private log, which enables a single
writer to share messages with many readers. Groups can then be
formed with separate logs for every writer, such that all members
subscribe to the logs of all other group members.
In general, we do not expect to see a single universal Talek
service; instead, we expect developers (or federations thereof) will
stand up separate Talek instances (e.g., one for Instagram and one
for Twitter). In practice, a single application might even run two
parallel instances of Talek, e.g., one for text-based data, and onewith
higher latency for images. Running separate instances will allow
developers to better tune Talek’s parameters to their application.
4.1 Talek’s Client Interface
Talek achieves our security goal by requiring all users to behave
identically from the perspective of any colluding set of l − 1 servers. A
key step in this direction is decoupling the real rate at which a user
generates application read/write requests from the rate at which
network read/write operations are performed.
As Figure 2 illustrates, developers link their messaging appli-
cation to the Talek client library, which maintains internal read-
and write queues. Whenever a request is issued by the messaging
application, Talek places its payload on the corresponding internal
queue. The Talek client library issues equal-sized Read and Write
network requests at a rate that is independent of the user’s real re-
quest rate, issuing a dummy request (i.e., a FakeWrite or a FakeRead)
if the respective queue is empty. To preserve privacy, a FakeWrite
App
libtalek
Client Developer Interface (CDI)
subscribe()
ReadWrite
Network Protocol Interface (NPI)
Server 1
publish()
write-queue
Data
Server 2 Server 3
read-queue
Figure 2: TalekClient Interface.Application calls are translated by the client library
into scheduled messages with equal-sized parameters and contents that appear random
to an adversary. Clients behave identically from the perspective of any l − 1 servers.
(FakeRead) request, including its parameters and payload, must
be indistinguishable from a RealWrite (RealRead) request. Talek
achieves this by defining a globally-fixed message size, z, to which
messages are split and padded to fit. Messages are then encrypted
with a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme [14] to provide
confidentiality and authenticity.
Choosing appropriate network rates. In practice, the developer
should measure real global usage and sample randomly from this
aggregate distribution. They could also configure a fixed burst of
messages every time a user comes online. Privacy is preserved as
long as the distribution of requests is independent of user activity.
4.2 Oblivious Logging Overview
Decoupling the real rate at which a user generates read/write re-
quests from the network request rate is insufficient for privacy, as it
fails to hide which users read each other’s messages. Hence, Talek
uses PIR (§2) to allow users to retrieve records privately. However,
PIR alone does not explain how to write messages to the servers or
how to let communication partners know which messages to read.
To allow clients to read and write messages privately without ex-
plicit coordination, Talek issues writes to pseudo-random locations
on each server, similar to prior work [9, 10, 61, 87, 89]. We call our
version of this technique oblivious logging. The sequence of write
locations is determined by applying a pseudorandom function, PRF ,
to a secret log handle shared (using control logs §5.5 ) between the
log’s writer and readers. Readers use PIR to retrieve messages by
following the PRF-derived sequence of locations.
Hence, server simply see a series of seemingly random writes
and PIR-protected reads, hiding the communication patterns be-
tween writers and readers. Exposure of the log handle (e.g., by
an untrustworthy group member) will expose the writer’s access
pattern, but not reader consumption patterns, since the latter are
protected information theoretically by PIR’s guarantees.
4.3 Talek’s Server Design
Servers store a limited set of messages to allow asynchronous
senders and receivers to be decoupled in time. Since the cost of PIR
operations scales linearly with database size, for good performance
we fix the number of messages stored on each server to n, garbage
collecting the oldest. n is directly related to the time-to-live, TTL,
for messages, which dictates how tightly synchronized senders and
5
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Server 1
Client
L1#1B1
write(buckets,data)
L2#2 L1#3
L1#2 L2#4 L2#5
L2#1 L3#1 L3#4
L1#4 L3#3 L1#5
L2#3 L3#2 L2#6
B2
B3
B4
B5
….
….
Blocked Hash Table
B6 …. ….
L3#4
L4#1
L2#6
L1#7
L1#6
….
n
d
b
Legend
Buckets: {B1,B2,…}
Logs: {L1,L2,…}
Rolling window
Figure 3: Server Data Structures and Workflow. Garbage collection discards all
but the latest n messages. Client writes specify two random buckets in which each
message can be placed, forming a blocked cuckoo hash table. Logs are spread over the
hash table, and read using PIR. Messages in the same log are colored with the same
shade in the diagram.
receivers must be. As the number of clients in the system grows,
the system requires larger values of n to support the same TTL.
Like prior messaging systems [9, 10], we face the challenge of
finding a way to efficiently pack messages into a dense data struc-
ture that is compatible with PIR. One of Talek’s key innovations
is the use of a blocked cuckoo hash table [36, 74], characterized
by a fixed value of b buckets each containing d messages. Each
client Write request explicitly specifies (to the servers) two pseudo-
randomly chosen buckets in which the message can be inserted.
The servers apply the standard cuckoo-hash insertion algorithm,
which potentially results in cuckoo evictions if both buckets are
full, but guarantees that every item ends up in one of its two hash-
selected locations. When the client performs a Read request, the
hash table is treated as a PIR database with each hash bucket as an
entry. The client uses PIR to retrieve an entire hash bucket without
revealing to the server which bucket it retrieved.
Blocked cuckoo hashing has a number of desirable properties.
Compared to chained hash tables, all buckets have an equal fixed
size, a necessary requirement for PIR. Further, only a single copy of
each message written is stored, minimizing storage overhead. To
handle collisions, the size of the table does need to be larger than
n, but with blocked cuckoo hashing the overhead is generally less
than 20% for reasonable values of the bucket size d . This also helps
minimize the cost of PIR operations, which grow with the size of
the database. Finally, there are only two possible locations for each
message, and thus a client issues at most two Read requests to check
both buckets where a message could be stored; this is important as
PIR operations are expensive. If the client finds the message it is
looking for in the first bucket, then it can use its next Read request
for another RealRead, rather than querying the second cuckoo hash
location. From the server’s perspective, the client is simply issuing
a stream of opaque PIR requests.
5 TALEK’S CORE OPERATIONS
This section expands on the overview from §4 to provide details
on the Talek protocol for creating single-writer, multi-reader logs.
Log handles (§5.2) allow readers to find the latest content from
writers without explicit coordination. They dictate how messages
are written into the servers’ cuckoo hash tables (§5.3), and how
Client Developer Interface (CDI)
Publish(log, message)
Subscribe(log)
Network Protocol Interface (NPI)
Write(bucket1, bucket2, encryptedMsg, interestVector)
Read(requestVectors[])→ encryptedData
GetUpdates()→ globalInterestVector
Client State
• loдs - List of subscribed logs
•writeQueue - Queue of write operations
• r eadQueue - Queue of read operations
Server State
• loд - Global log of write operations
• table - Blocked cuckoo hash table
Figure 4: Talek Interfaces and Client/Server State. Global interest vectors are
described in §7.
Globally Configured
l constant Number of servers
n constant Number of messages stored on server
b constant Number of server-side buckets
d constant Depth of a bucket
z constant Size of a single message
w constant Per-user rate of writes
r constant Per-user rate of reads
Dynamically Measured
m variable Number of online clients
TT L n/(m ∗w ) Lifetime of a message on the server
load n/(b ∗ d ) Load factor of the server hash table
Figure 5: Talek Variables. Globally configured parameters are fixed across all clients
and servers for an instance of Talek.
readers retrieve messages using PIR (§5.4). Because reads are done
with PIR, many readers can poll the same log repeatedly without
revealing information. Control logs (§5.5) simplify group messaging
sessions. Finally, we offer some thoughts on the tradeoffs involved
in choosing Talek’s parameters (§5.6) and provide some intuition
(§5.7) for Talek’s proof of security (Appendix A.2).
Figure 4 summarizes the client/server interfaces and state; de-
tailed pseudocode for the client and servers are in Appendix B.
5.1 Notation
For convenience, Figure 5 summarizes constants that parameterize
Talek’s design. In §5.6, we discuss configuring these parameters.
Wewrite PKEncpk (text) for the encryption of text underpk , and
PKDecsk (cipher ) for the decryption of cipher under sk . Clients also
have access to an efficient symmetric encryption scheme. We write
Enck (text) for the encryption of text with key k , and Deck (cipher )
for the decryption of cipher . Let PRF (key, input) denote a pseudo-
random function family and PRNG(seed) denote a cryptographi-
cally secure pseudorandom number generator. We use | to denote
tagged concatenation.
5.2 Log Handles
When a user creates a new log, Talek generates a secret log handle, τ ,
containing a unique ID, id , encryption key, kenc , and two seeds, ks1
and ks2. Using control logs (§5.5), the log handle is shared between
the writer and readers of a log. All messages in the log are encrypted
with kenc , e.g., Enckenc (messaдe). We further assign all messages in
a log a sequence number, seqNo. This sequence number is internal
to Talek, and does not preclude application-layer logic to track and
order messages. The two seed values are used in conjunction with a
pseudorandom function family, PRF (seed, seqNo) ∈ {0 . . . (b − 1)},
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to produce two unique and deterministic sequences of bucket loca-
tions for writes. Similar to frequency hopping [38, 41] and construc-
tions in prior work [9, 10, 61, 87, 89], log handles allow writers and
readers to agree on a pseudorandom sequence of buckets without
online coordination. As discussed in §3, additional properties, like
forward secrecy, can be layered atop this basic construction.
5.3 Writing into a Cuckoo Hash Table
A key part of Talek’s design is that server-side state is arranged in
a blocked cuckoo hash table [36, 74], where each server’s storage is
organized into b buckets, each bucket storing d messages, each of
size z. The value of b is chosen in conjunction with the PRF family,
such that the output of a PRF is uniformly distributed across the
buckets. The servers’ message capacity, n, is chosen as a fraction
of the capacity of the cuckoo table, b · d . This fraction is set to
ensure with high probability that a message will fit with minimal
rearranging of the cuckoo table [36]; hence insertion costs O(1).
Because cuckoo hashing is history-dependent and PIR requires
consistent replicas across all servers, we must ensure that all writes
are inserted in the same order. We address this via serialized PIR
(§6). The algorithm for inserting into a blocked cuckoo hash table
is also randomized, so the servers agree on a random seed, scuckoo ,
which they use to ensure they all make the same (pseudo-)random
choices (if one or more servers make different choices, it affects
liveness, but not privacy).
When the Talek client library dequeues a message, M , with
sequence number seqNo from its internal write queue, it runs the
following RealWrite(τ , seqNo,M) algorithm:
β1 = PRF (τ .ks1, seqNo) ∈ [0..b − 1]
β2 = PRF (τ .ks2, seqNo) ∈ [0..b − 1]
data = Encτ .kenc (seqNo |M)
and sends the Write request, β1 |β2 |data, to the servers. If the write
queue is empty, it instead runs FakeWrite(); i.e., it chooses β1 and
β2 at random in [0..b − 1] and computes
data = Encτ .kenc (dummySeqNo |0z )
i.e., the encryption of a reserved sequence number and z zeroes.
Upon receiving the Write request, each server follows the stan-
dard cuckoo insertion algorithm:
(1) Delete the n-th oldest element.
(2) Insert β1 |β2 |data into either bucket β1 or bucket β2 if there is
spare capacity in either bucket.
(3) If both buckets are full, choose βe ∈ {β1, β2}, using randomness
derived from scuckoo . Let δe = β1 |β2 |data.
(4) Repeat the following until all values are inserted
(a) Try to insert δe in βe if the bucket has space.
(b) If not, randomly evict an entry in βe and insert δe there.
(c) Set δe to be the evicted value, and set βe to its alternate
bucket location.
5.4 Reading via PIR
When the Talek client library dequeues a log read at sequence
number seqNo from its internal read queue, it generates a Read
request using the following RealRead(τ , seqNo) algorithm. The li-
brary performs a PIR read (following the protocol from §2) for
bucket PRF (τ .ks1, seqNo) (i.e., the first possible cuckoo location).
The library attempts to decrypt every message in the bucket by
computing Decτ .kenc (data). If decryption succeeds and matches
seqNo,M is returned to the application. If not, the next time a Read
request should be issued (as determined by the randomized reading
schedule), the library performs a PIR read for the second cuckoo
location, i.e., PRF (τ .ks2, seqNo).
If the internal read queue is empty, the library runs FakeRead(),
which issues a PIR read for an arbitrary bucket.
5.5 Control Logs
To facilitate control messages between users, we establish a con-
trol log between every pair of users who want to communicate.
We expect the log handle for the control log to be generated and
exchanged out of band when users exchange and verify public keys.
When a user wants to give log access to one of their friends, they
send the new handle via the control log shared with the intended
subscriber. Once all subscribers have access to the log handle, the
log writer can write messages once to be read by many subscribers,
instead of sending individual messages through each pairwise con-
trol log. Revocation occurs by creating a new handle and sharing it
with the non-revoked subscribers.
Control logs are also used by Talek to coordinate between users.
If a user has been offline for an extended period, she can ask the
writer for the most recent sequence number of a particular log. Sim-
ilarly, users can send retransmission requests for missed messages.
By definition, these requests leak information to the sender, but the
sender and receiver are assumed to trust each other.
A client also uses a control log to periodically send heartbeat
messages to itself. If these messages are lost, it serves as a hint to
the client of a denial-of-service attack.
5.6 Configuration Considerations
Online clients issue Read and Write requests at rates of r and w
respectively, as dictated by the random distribution (e.g., uniform or
Poisson) chosen by the application developer. Ideally, the distribu-
tion should closely match the application’s typical usage patterns.
Choosing a more aggressive distribution (e.g., with more frequent
reads and writes) will improve the user experience but incur higher
protocol overheads due to extra cover traffic sent when no real
requests are ready. Conversely, a more conservative distribution
will waste fewer resources at the cost of potentially increasing the
latency of real messages.
Talek is configured with a window size, n, such that messages
older than the most recent n are garbage collected and deleted. It is
possible for clients to miss a message if they fall behind, and the
message is garbage collected. In this case, readers can request a
retransmission (§5.5).
Cuckoo tables have a maximum capacity that is lower than the
size of the table, b · d . The ratio of the maximum capacity of the
cuckoo table to the allocated space is known as the load factor, a
function of the bucket depth, d . For example, the load factor for
d = 1 is less than 0.5, such that one must allocate twice as much
space as the number of items in the table. The load factor grows
asymptotically towards 1 as d increases [36]. For values of d > 3,
the load factor is over 95%. A high load factor translates to a more
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densely packed table and cheaper PIR operations for the same
number of messages in the database, n.
In Talek, the number of buckets b and the bucket depth d are
fixed to match the expected client workloads. Clients issue Reads
with a random b-bit request vector and receive aO(d)-sized bucket
in response. A smaller value for b and higher d enables cheaper
PIR reads and smaller request vectors in PIR requests at the cost of
larger network overhead for the response. This configuration lends
itself to frequent writes, common in chat applications. Conversely,
a high value of b and low value of d resembles a traditional cuckoo
hash table, resulting in a lower load factor, but better bandwidth
utilization. This configuration is appropriate for infrequent writes
of large messages, such as for images.
5.7 Security Analysis
We formally prove the security of oblivious logging in §A.2. In-
formally, we assume that the writer trusts the consumers of its
log and prove security by reduction to cryptographic assumptions.
For Read, we rely on the security properties offered by PIR. PIR
queries that correspond to legitimate requests are indistinguishable
from a PIR query for a random item [27]. For Write, we rely on
the security properties of a PRF and our encryption algorithm. We
use a symmetric authenticated encryption algorithm for message
payloads. For any Write, the bucket locations are either generated
by a PRF using the log handle’s seed values, (ks1,ks2), or chosen at
random. An attacker who can distinguish between these two cases
immediately breaks the PRF’s security.
A malicious client has the ability to impact service availability
by deviating from the protocol and sending all its writes to a single
bucket. This attack (and other forms of denial-of-service) is limited
by servers enforcing the fixed Write ratew per client, the number
of Sybil clients the attacker can obtain, and the size of the database,
n. The attack is further mitigated by the self-balancing nature of
cuckoo tables, where legitimate messages can be evicted to their
alternate locations, and the fact that the malicious client will not
know which buckets to target to disrupt a specific communication.
6 SERIALIZED PIR
Similar to Riffle [60], to reduce the network costs of Read requests
for the client, we introduce a serialized version of IT-PIR, which
offloads work from clients to the servers. Unlike Riffle’s design,
ours avoids the need for the servers to keep per-client state.
At a high level, we choose an arbitrary server to be the leader,𝒮0,
with the rest of the servers forming the follower set, [𝒮1, . . . ,𝒮l−1].
All Read and Write requests are directed to the leader. The leader
adds a global sequence number to each request (to ensure operations
are handled consistently across the servers) and forwards it to the
followers. Each Read request sent to the leader contains a PIR
query for each server, encrypted under its respective public key.
The followers each send their response back to the leader (rather
than the client). The response is carefully masked to preserve the
confidentiality of each server’s results while allowing the leader to
combine them on behalf of the client. Overall, the client’s outbound
request bandwidth is the same as before, but the inbound bandwidth
is only the size of a single response, rather than l responses.
To issue a serialized PIR request the client,𝒞 proceeds as follows.
(1) 𝒞 generates b-bit PIR requests for each server, {q0, . . . ,ql−1}
(b is the number of server hash buckets).
(2) 𝒞 generates a high-entropy random seed for each server, {p0, . . . ,pl−1}
(3) 𝒞 encrypts each server’s parameters with its respective public
key and generates a Read request,
PKEncpk0 (q0 |p0), . . . , PKEncpkl−1 (ql−1 |pl−1)
(4) 𝒞 sends this request to the leader,𝒮0, who forwards it to the
followers along with a global sequence number.
(5) In parallel, each server,𝒮i , decrypts its respective PIR request
vector, qi and computes its response, Ri .
(6) Each server,𝒮i , also computes a random one-time mask, Pi =
PRNG(pi ), from the seed parameter. This mask should the same
size as Ri .
(7) Each server,𝒮i , responds to𝒮0 with Ri
⊕
Pi .
(8) 𝒮0 combines the server responses and responds to 𝒞 with
R0
⊕
P0
⊕
. . .Rl−1
⊕
Pl−1
(9) 𝒞 restores the bucket of interest by XOR’ing this response with
each server’s mask, P0
⊕
. . .
⊕
Pl−1
Security:With respect to privacy, this serialized variant of PIR is
provably equivalent to the traditional PIR scheme described in §2.
The proof is straightforward and sketched in §A.2. Hence, even if
the leader is malicious, it can only undermine liveness, not privacy.
Correctness and Liveness: The leader is only responsible for as-
signing a global sequence number, which does not affect security or
correctness. If the leader misrepresents the global sequence number
of a message, it could cause those replicas to become inconsistent.
Because any follower could also deny service by failing to respond
or deviating from the protocol, the leader is in no more privileged
a position to affect correctness or liveness of the system than any
other server in the system. In §5.5 we describe how clients detect
such attacks on availability. Furthermore, serialized PIR is compati-
ble with the Byzantine-fault-tolerant varieties of PIR, which can be
used to improve liveness guarantees (§3.2).
7 PRIVATE NOTIFICATIONS
Regularly polling for new messages presents two problems. First,
because every user polls at the same rate, message latency increases
as a user subscribes to more logs. Second, it is hard to know which
log to poll at any given time.
Inspired by previous uses of Bloom filters for private membership
queries [21, 42], we introduce a private notification system that
allows users to determine when new messages have been published
to a log without revealing the list of logs to which they subscribe. By
detaching reads from notifications, clients can prioritize reads and
reduce how often they read buckets for logs without new messages.
The private notifications system works as follows:
(1) With every Write request, clients send an interest vector,
privately encoding the log handle and message sequence
number of this request.
(2) Servers maintain a global interest vector which encodes the
set of (log handle, message sequence number)-pairs for all
messages on the server.
(3) Clients periodically query the lead server for the global in-
terest vector.
We expand on these algorithms below and in Appendix B.
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Computing an Interest Vector. During a RealWrite(τ , seqNo,M),
the client creates an interest vector by inserting into an empty
Bloom filter that uses cryptographic hash functions:
intVec ← BloomFilter ()
intVec .insert(τ .id |seqNo)
For a FakeWrite request, we insert a randomvalue instead ofτ .id |seqNo.
Maintaing a Global Interest Vector. The global interest vector is
the union of the interest vectors written to the server. Servers peri-
odically sign their global interest vector and exchange signatures in
amulti-signature scheme [18], which allows the lead server to aggre-
gate all signatures into a single compact one. Upon a GetUpdates()
request from the client, the leader sends that signature, along with
the global interest vector, to the client for verification.
In practice, Talek employs compressed Bloom filters [70], and
both clients and serversmaintain awindow of Bloomfilter deltas [70],
with each delta summarizing changes since the previous delta. By
discarding old deltas as new ones arrive, we avoid saturating the
global interest vector. Altogether, compressed Bloom filters with
delta compression result in updates of less than 10k bytes for our
experiments with 1M messages stored on the server. We set clients
to fetch updates every 20 reads to further amortize this cost.
Security Analysis. The security of private notifications relies on
the cryptographic hash functions (modeled as a random oracle)
used in the Bloom filter. As long as we use a log ID with sufficient
entropy, each interest vector provides a negligible advantage in the
indistinguishability security game. We give a formal proof in §A.2
(Game 4).
Private notifications are only used to prioritize reads on the
internal request queue. As such, it has no impact on Talek’s security
goals, since it has no visible effect on the network protocol interface.
It simply reorders the internal schedule of private requests.
8 IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate Talek’s practicality, we have implemented a prototype
in approximately 6,200 lines of code; the source code is available
on GitHub.We have implemented two versions. The first, written in
Go, runs entirely on the CPU. The second offloads PIR operations to
the GPU using a kernel written in C on OpenCL, sharing memory
between the CPU implementation and the GPU. The prototype
uses SipHash [11] as the PRF, and NaCl’s box API [15] for public
and symmetric authenticated encryption. NaCl’s API relies on a
combination of Curve25519, Salsa20, and Poly1305.
9 EVALUATION
Our evaluation addresses the following questions:
• 9.2What is the cost of operations for clients and servers?
• 9.3What is the cost of cover traffic?
• 9.4 How does system performance scale with more users?
• 9.5What is the end-to-end latency of messages?
• 9.6 How does Talek compare with previous work?
9.1 Setup
All experiments are conducted on Amazon EC2 P2 instances. These
virtual machines are allocated 4 cores on an Intel Xeon E5–2686v4
Messages on Server (n)
10K 100K 1M
Client CPU costs (µs)
Generate new log handle 7753 7753 7753
Write 67 67 67
Issue PIR query 65 574 6888
Process PIR response 146 146 146
Server CPU costs (ms)
PIR Read: CPU 1.34 11.10 88.10
PIR Read: GPU 0.07 0.54 4.36
Write 0.02 0.02 0.02
Server storage costs (MB)
1 KB messages 24 241 2410
Network costs (KB)
GetUpdates 0.21 1.40 14.00
Read request 0.96 9.39 93.72
Read response 4.16 4.16 4.16
Write request 1.08 1.08 1.08
Figure 6: Cost of Individual Talek Operations.We vary the number, n, of 1KB
messages stored on the server.
processor and 61 GB of RAM. They also include an NVIDIA K80
GPU with 2496 cores and 12GB of memory. We use 3 servers; one
is chosen as the leader and the others are followers. We allocated
two VMs to run user clients. Each user client issues periodic Read
and Write requests to the server.
While our experiments are run in a single data center, we expect
the performance to be similar for a more realistic cross-data center
setting. This would incur higher network latency, both to reach
the leader and in communicating between servers. However these
latencies will not impact the results here which focus on the main
bottleneck: the server-side computational cost of Talek.
To evaluate a realistic workload, we used the Ubuntu IRC logs
from 2016 [3], consisting of 1554790 messages over 32,834 unique
usernames. We generate a unique log in Talek for each writer in an
IRC channel. We varied the number of users,m ∈ (0, 32K], and the
number ofmessages in the database,n ∈ {10K, 32K, 100K, 500K, 1M}.
We fix the message size to z =1 KB. In order to understand the trade-
off between bandwidth and end-to-end message latency, we vary
the global client read and write rates.
9.2 Cost of Operations
To understand Talek’s costs, we benchmark different components
of the system. Each value is the average of 200 runs. We vary the
number of messages on the server, n ∈ {10K, 100K, 1M}. We fix
the bucket depth in the blocked cuckoo table to 4, such that clients
retrieve 4 messages at a time. This depth allows the cuckoo table to
support a load factor of 95%. The number of buckets is chosen to
hold n messages at the maximum load factor for the table. Figure 6
highlights the results.
In general, client costs are low due to IT-PIR. Each Write en-
crypts the message and uses a PRF to determine the bucket location.
The cost of generating a PIR query for Read also increases with
the database size. Larger values of n translate to more buckets and
larger PIR request vectors.
For the server, we implement two versions of IT-PIR. Our CPU
implementation streams the database through the local CPU cache
while accumulating responses to service each batch of queries. Its
performance is limited by memory-bus throughput. The GPU im-
plementation accelerates performance by 1–2 orders of magnitude
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Figure 7: Impact of Read Interval. Average daily bandwidth per client and end-to-
end message latency as a function of read interval when replaying Ubuntu IRC logs
from 2016. When clients are configured to send messages once per second, each client
sends/receives ∼148MB per day to achieve end-to-end message latencies < 2 seconds.
As we increase the interval of the read schedule, more read requests represent real
work, at the expense of end-to-end latency.
by taking advantage of the inherent parallelism of PIR operations
across many GPU cores and the optimized on-device memory hier-
archy. Unless otherwise stated, henceforward, results are for our
GPU implementation. Batch coding or preprocessing [65] would
further improve this throughput bottleneck, by an estimated 3×, at
the cost of higher latency for writes to become visible to subsequent
reads. Writes incur negligible cost compared to the cost of reads.
Storage costs scale as expected, since our current implementation
stores all messages twice. Writes are applied to the working copy
stored in DRAM. Periodically, a snapshot of this state is copied into
the GPU. Read requests are batched and forwarded to the GPU. The
leader is free to reorder reads without violating serializability.
Network costs between client and server are minimal. Clients
must submit a read request containing a b-bit vector for each server.
The size of Read responses and Write requests are within a small
factor of the message size. The global interest vector returned from
GetUpdates grows linearly with n in order to preserve a fixed false
positive rate of 0.02 and a TTL of 100 write intervals. This cost is
independent of message size. Updates trade off bandwidth with
false positive rate. The network costs per operation are identical
between servers, as both Read and Write operations simply relay
from the leader to followers.
9.3 Cost of Cover Traffic
Because each Talek client must generate network traffic on a regular
schedule that is independent from the user’s real usage, developers
must choose a global schedule that is appropriate for their applica-
tion. Naturally, there is a trade-off between efficiency and message
latency. To quantify this tradeoff, we ran an experiment replaying
the Ubuntu IRC logs into Talek. We model clients as mobile devices
that only send requests when the device is online. Studies have
shown that users are engaged with their mobile devices only 8.6%
of the time [25]. We configured servers to store 524,000 messages,
such that servers can keep up with read requests if each client reads
one message per second. We then configure client write schedules
to maintain a message TTL of one day on the servers.
Figure 7 shows the effect of increasing client read intervals.When
clients are configured to read every second, average end-to-end
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Figure 8: Talek’s Throughput. Throughput of the system when varying the number
of real clients. Each client independently issues read and write requests every 5 seconds.
Each line represents a different value for n, the number of messages on the server.
Larger values of n require scanning a larger table, resulting in lower throughput.
message latency is 1.71 seconds. The latency exceeds the read in-
terval, since many clients subscribe to multiple logs, so a burst of
writes from different writers may be bottlenecked by the read inter-
val. This latency comes at the cost of every client using 148MB of
bandwidth per day. For comparison, the installer for Adobe Reader
is ∼200 MB, and the top ten most downloaded apps in 2018 on the
Google Play store [86] range from 13-66 MB. If daily bandwidth
usage is of concern, we can drastically reduce it by increasing the
read interval by a few seconds, while keeping latencies below 10
seconds. At higher read intervals, we reach optimal network usage,
where most read requests corresponds to real work. However, as
read requests are increasingly rate-limited, message latencies grow
quickly. In practice, application developers will need to choose read
intervals based on acceptable usability and network costs. This
design decision will depend on application workloads.
In future sections, we fix the read interval to 5 seconds, balancing
network and latency considerations. At this read interval, end-to-
end message latencies are 10.7 seconds, about half of read requests
are FakeRead requests, and each client will send about 49.4MB
per day over the network. For comparison, Snapchat, the #2 top
downloaded mobile app for both iOS and Android, consumes 14-
86MB per day per client [1]. Assuming the system supports 32,000
active users, servers will need a network connection of at least
18.3MB/s.
9.4 Throughput
To understand Talek’s peak performance, we experimented with a
simulated messaging workload. Each client sends a message every
five seconds, and receives a message every five seconds. For each
data point, we spawn a number of clients and measure the leader’s
response rate over 5 minutes, giving the system enough time to
reach steady-state performance. Writing in Talek is cheap, so we
limit our workload such that each written message must be read
before being garbage collected. If writes were not throttled, servers
could easily accommodate higher write throughput, while reads
are bottlenecked by PIR computation.
Figure 8 shows the results for three values ofn ∈ {32K, 131K, 524K},
the number of messages stored on the server. For small numbers
of clients, the server achieves linear growth in throughput, demon-
strating that the PIR operations are keeping up with read requests.
The throughput is bottlenecked by the GPU’s PIR process. Smaller
values ofn correspond to a smaller cuckoo table, resulting in cheaper
PIR operations and higher throughput. We only evaluate the system
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Figure 9: Talek’s Latency. End-to-end latency of message delivery when a client
subscribes to multiple logs. Each data point represents 20 trials. With notifications,
clients prioritize logs with new messages.
with numbers of clients,m, such thatm < n, corresponding to a
message lifetime of at least one round of reads.
To further improve server performance, each Talek “server”
could internally consist of multiple machines, each handling a por-
tion of the PIR database. We defer this optimization to future work.
9.5 End-to-End Latency with Notifications
To understand the latency of message delivery, we used the same
messaging workload as in the throughput experiment. We mea-
sure the end-to-end time for a message sent by the sender to be
seen, varying the number of logs to which the receiver client is
subscribed. The spread of each value over 20 trials reflects the read
and write rates. Figure 9 shows the results with and without private
notifications. When notifications are off, the client must poll each
log in a round robin fashion. Because the read rate is fixed, the
end-to-end latency grows linearly with the number of subscribed
logs. With private notifications, the receiver learns which logs have
new messages, allowing it to prioritize that read. As a result, the
end-to-end latency for a single message is relatively fixed.
9.6 Comparison with Prior Work
Talek explores a new design point in the space of private messaging.
To understand the performance implications, we compare Talek’s
performance to representatives of other interesting design points
using their publicly available implementations. Pung [10] and its
refinement [9], which we dub Pung++, share a similar security
goal with Talek, but adopt a stronger threat model incompatible
with IT-PIR. Riposte [28] shares Talek’s threat model and employs
“reverse” IT-PIR, but offers anonymous broadcast (i.e., senders are
anonymous but no private read operation is supported) and targets
a weaker privacy goal (k-anonymity). Vuvuzela [89] shares Talek’s
threat model but targets another (weaker) privacy goal (differential
privacy). We describe additional protocol differences in §10.
In Figure 10, we summarize the asymptotic complexity of each
system. These asymptotics, however, hide vastly different constants.
Hence, Figure 11 shows the concrete single-threaded throughput
of each system. For each system, we sanity checked that our results
were consistent with those reported by the authors. For Pung, we
use a single server. For Talek, Vuvuzela, and Riposte, systems that
rely on an anytrust threat model, we use a common security param-
eter of 3 servers. In these systems, larger numbers of servers only
improves security, not performance. Write performance is similar
between Talek, Pung++, and Vuvuzela, which all dominate Riposte
Talek Pung++ Riposte Vuvuzela
Client CPU Read O (ln) O (√n) ✗ O (l )
Write O (1) O (1) O (√n) O (l )
Total Server CPU Read O (ln) O (n) ✗ O ( l2+ln
n2 )
Write O (l ) O (1) O (ln) O ( l2+ln
n2 )
Total Server Storage O (ln) O (n) O (ln) O (l + n)
Network Read request O (ln) O (√n) ✗ O (1)
Read response O (d ) O (1) ✗ O (1)
Write O (1) O (1) O (l √n) O (1)
Figure 10: Asymptotic Comparison.We compare costs between related work that
uses an anytrust or stronger threat model. Parameters are the number of servers, l , the
number n of client messages in the system and, for Talek, the number of messages in a
bucket d . Riposte does not specify a read mechanism. Client CPU is for one read/write
request. Total server CPU is the total cost of l servers (or for Pung++, a single server)
for one read or write request. Network costs are for read/write requests between the
client and the server(s). Pung++’s costs do not include constructing and sending an
oracle that maps message indices to locations within a bucket (§10), while Talek’s
costs do not include private notifications, as both are orthogonal to the main design.
due to its O(√n) cost. Read performance, however, demonstrates
further tradeoffs. Pung++’s throughput lags Talek’s CPU imple-
mentation by up to two orders of magnitude, which in turn lags
Vuvuzela by 1-3 orders of magnitude. The Riposte implementation
does not include an implementation for reads due to its focus on
broadcast applications. Pung++ reads are more expensive predom-
inantly due to its use of homomorphic encryption for C-PIR (to
support a stronger threat model) and differences in its read protocol.
Vuvuzela’s weaker security goal allows it to scale better than Talek.
Talek’s GPU implementation improves read performance by ∼ 20×.
10 RELATEDWORK
Weprovide an overview of related systems that hide communication
patterns. Unger et al. provide a more detailed survey [88]. For
convenience, Figure 12 summarizes the discussion.
PIR-based systems. Theoretical work proves that the collective
work required by the servers to answer a client’s request scales at
least linearly with the size of the database [12]. While it is possible
to circumvent this lower bound using database preprocessing [12]
or an offline/online model [30], we cannot take advantage of such
approaches since our database changes constantly.
On the systems side, some work in this space leverages assump-
tions about specific application workloads to make PIR practical in
a particular setting. For example, DP5 [19] is a private chat pres-
ence system. The security of the protocol depends on chat presence
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Figure 11: Performance Comparison of Read and Write handlers of various sys-
tems. Because Riposte is a broadcast protocol, it does not include a read operation.
Note the log scale on the y-axis.
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System Security Threat Technique Application
Goal Model
Talek indisting. ≥ 1 IT-PIR group msg.
Pynchon [79] k-anon. ≥ 1 mixnet/IT-PIR email
Riffle [60] k-anon. ≥ 1 mixnet/IT-PIR file-sharing
Riposte [28] k-anon. ≥ 1 IT-PIR broadcast
Dissent [29] k-anon. ≥ 1 DC-net broadcast
Atom [58] k-anon. ≥ f mixnet broadcast
Vuvuzela [89] diff. privacy ≥ 1 mixnet 1–1 msg.
Stadium [87] diff. privacy ≥ f mixnet 1–1 msg.
Karaoke [61] diff. privacy ≥ f mixnet 1–1 msg.
Pung [9, 10] indisting. 0 C-PIR group msg.
ORAM [82–84] indisting. 0 ORAM storage
DP5 [19] indisting. ≥ 1 IT-PIR chat presence
Popcorn [50] indisting. ≥ 1 C-PIR/IT-PIR video stream
XRD [59] indisting. ≥ f mixnet 1–1 msg.
Figure 12: Comparison of Privacy Systems. Indistinguishability-based security
goals offer the strongest level of privacy. Systems based on k-anonymity and differential
privacy leak information over time [33, 56, 67]. The threat model column denotes the
number of servers that must be honest for security properties to hold; systems marked
with f require a fraction (e.g., 20-80%) of servers to be honest.
workloads and does not generalize to group messaging. Similarly,
Popcorn [50] uses both C-PIR and IT-PIR to construct a private
read-only video streaming system over a static video database.
Some systems support general-purpose anonymous writing, but
do not support private reading. Ostrovsky and Shoup propose pri-
vate information storage (PIS) [73], which allows a client to write
to a row in a database of n rows without revealing which row was
updated. Writing via PIS is expensive, incurring poly-logarithmic
communication, compared with O(1) for Talek. Riposte [28] ex-
pands on this work to support a scalable broadcast system. Riposte
and Talek share a similar anytrust threat model, but Riposte has a
weaker security goal based on k-anonymity within a round of com-
munication. Riposte does not promise privacy over multiple rounds
of communication, and writes require O(√n) messages. Other sys-
tems, like Talek, aim for general-purpose private messaging, and
hence support a wider range of applications. For instance, Pynchon
Gate [79] is system where emails are sent to servers via mixnets.
Emails are dumped daily to distributor servers, where clients use
IT-PIR to privately retrieve them. While PIR hides which messages
clients read, the email server stores the communication patterns
between email addresses. Riffle [60] uses mixnets to send messages
and IT-PIR to retrieve them. Riffle provides k-anonymity; in each
round, the adversary learns that a message originated from 1 of k
users. As discussed in §3, in practice, k-anonymity typically pro-
vides weaker privacy than access sequences indistinguishability.
Pung [10] (and its refinement [9]) supports a key-value store
based on C-PIR with a security goal of UO-ER, which is similar to
Talek’s access sequence indistinguishability (see §3). Pung targets
a stronger threat model than Talek; Pung assumes all servers are
untrusted. Hence, Pung only requires one server to provide func-
tionality compared with l for Talek. Pung’s stronger threat model
comes at the cost of performance. Pung uses an implementation
of C-PIR for reads called SealPIR [7, 9], which leverages the SEAL
homomorphic encryption library [80] based on the Fan-Vercauteren
fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) system [43]. Thus, Pung in-
curs orders of magnitude higher computational and network costs,
compared with Talek.
Additionally, Pung uses an interactive binary search algorithm
for retrieval, requiring O(loд(n)) round trips between client and
server, compared to theO(1) cuckoo table lookup in Talek. Thus, to
retrieve a 1 KB message from a database size of n = 32K messages,
Pung requires >36MB of data. Pung++ reduces this overhead by
leveraging a more efficient C-PIR protocol, probabilistic batch cod-
ing, and reverse cuckoo hashing. The latter places each element into
all candidate buckets, and requires each client to have an oracle to
tell it which index within a bucket contains the message it wants
to retrieve. The authors suggest instantiating the oracle by having
the client retrieve a Bloom filter that encodes the index of every
message. Hence, the client must download O(n) data each time it
wants to discover the location of new messages. Hence, Pung++
still requires more than >1MB of data for the same workload, while
Talek makes 2 requests and transfers <12 KB (10× less).
Mixnet-based Systems. Chaum mixnets [23, 24, 49, 54] and veri-
fiable cryptographic shuffles [20, 44, 71] are a way to obfuscate the
source of a message. As with PIR, some mixnet-based systems pro-
vide anonymous broadcasting, rather than private messaging. For
example, Atom [58] implements anonymous broadcast by dividing
the servers into multiple groups and then repeatedly shuffling a
batch of ciphertexts within each group and forwarding parts of
the batch to neighboring groups. Atom assumes that some fraction
of servers are honest. In particular, Atom’s security relies on each
group having at least one honest server.
Mixnets have been applied to scalable private messaging [32],
but require messages from honest users in every round to form an
anonymity set. When a mixnet is used to access an encrypted data-
base, unlinkability can be difficult to guarantee when the database is
untrusted. Network-level onion routing systems [37, 55, 77] can also
be used to access an encrypted database with similar limitations.
Using differential privacy analysis, Vuvuzela [89], Stadium [87],
and Karaoke [61] formalize the amount of noise that honest shufflers
would need to inject to bound information leakage at the database.
These systems have a weaker security goal than Talek – which
provides indistinguishability even under an active adversary, but
they offer substantially better performance than Talek. Vuvuzela
scales to millions of users with a peak throughput of nearly 4Mmes-
sages/min using the same number of servers as Talek. Stadium [87]
achieves Vuvuzela’s security goal with even better performance,
but it weakens the threat model to assume that some fraction (the
authors suggest 50-75%) of servers behave honestly. Karaoke [61]
extends Vuvuzela with an efficient noise verification technique and
a security goal of optimistic indistinguishability, where no informa-
tion is leaked under a passive adversary, but the system falls back
to differential privacy under an active attack. Similar to Stadium,
Karaoke assumes some fraction (the authors suggest 60-80%) of
servers behave honestly.
Like Stadium and Karaoke, XRD [59] is a mix-net system that
assumes a fraction of servers behave honestly and requires sim-
ilarly large fraction to achieve good performance. In contrast to
Stadium and Karaoke, XRD offers cryptographic privacy similar to
the guarantees provided by Talek.
Stadium, Karaoke, and XRD include support for horizontal scal-
ing (linear scaling for Stadium and Karaoke, square root scaling for
XRD), so that adding more servers improves the system’s through-
put. As discussed in §9.4, Talek is compatible with instantiating
each “server” via multiple machines to provide better throughput.
This provides a subtly different form of scaling, however. Stadium,
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Karaoke, and XRD can increase performance by increasing the
number of participating organizations, while Talek increases the
number of machines held by the participating organizations. The
difference stems from Talek’s anytrust threat model.
DC-nets. DC-net systems [22, 48], like Herbivore [81] and Dis-
sent [29, 31, 90], are a method for anonymously broadcasting mes-
sages to a group using information-theoretic techniques. For each
message, all clients must broadcast random bits to every other
client. DC-nets enable effective broadcast messaging, but they are
not optimal for group messaging due to high network costs.
Oblivious RAM (ORAM). ORAM [46, 47, 72] allows a single trusted
client to access untrusted storage without revealing access patterns,
even to a strong adversary who controls the storage. High network
costs of reads, Ω(logn), and constant data reshuffling make ORAM
costly for systems with many users sharing data.
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11 CONCLUSION
We have explored a new point in the design space of private group
messaging: a very strong security guarantee based on access se-
quence indistinguishability coupled with an only slightly weak-
ened anytrust threat model. The result is a new built system, Talek,
which incorporates a careful series of design decisions and new
optimizations, including IT-PIR based on blocked cuckoo hashing,
serialized PIR, private notifications, and GPU-based acceleration.
Together, these demonstrate that this design point supports strong
performance for realistic workloads.
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A SECURITY PROOFS
A.1 Building Blocks
We provide formal definitions of the cryptographic building blocks
that we use in the security proof of our construction.
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We define a Private Information Retrieval scheme as specified by
Chor et al. [26], adapted to allow up to t servers to collude (whereas
they assume no collusion). The scheme allows a user, on a desired
index i and a random input r of length lrnd , to produce k queries
of length lq (one for each server). The servers respond according to
the strategies A1, . . . ,Ak with replies of length la . The user then
reconstructs the desired bit of the database based on these replies.
Definition A.1. Private Information Retrieval âĂŞ One-Round
Schemes. A k-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme
for a database of length n consists of:
• k query functions, Q1, . . . ,Qk : [n] × {0, 1}lrnd → {0, 1}lq
• k answer functions,A1, . . . ,Ak : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}lq → {0, 1}la
• a reconstruction function, R : [n]×{0, 1}lrnd ×({0, 1}la )k →
{0, 1}
These functions should satisfy
Correctness: For every x ∈ {0, 1}n , i ∈ [n], and r ∈ {0, 1}lrnd
R(i, r ,A1(x ,Q1(i, r )), . . . ,Ak (x ,Qk (i, r ))) = xi
t-Privacy: For every i, j ∈ [n], (q1, . . . ,qt ) ∈ ({0, 1}lq )t and
{s1, . . . , st } ⊂ {1, . . . ,k}
Pr((Qs1 (i, r ), . . . ,Qst (i, r )) = (q1, . . . ,qt )) =
Pr((Qs1 (j, r ), . . . ,Qst (j, r )) = (q1, . . . ,qt ))
where the probabilities are taken over a uniformly chosen r ∈
{0, 1}lrnd .
Note that while this definition is for a one-round PIR scheme, it
can be extended to multiple rounds where the queries in each round
are allowed to depend on answers received in previous rounds.
We use the following standard definitions of a pseudorandom
function and the IND-CCA security of the encryption scheme:
Definition A.2. Pseudorandom function
A function F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m1 → {0, 1}m2 is called a pseudo-
random function (PRF) if it satisfies the following:
• For all s ∈ {0, 1}n and all x ∈ {0, 1}m1 , F (s,x) can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
• Any PPT adversary 𝒜 is successful in the following game
with probability at most 12 + neдl(n), where neдl(·) is a neg-
ligible function:
– The challenger chooses s ← {0, 1}n and a bit b ← {0, 1}
at random.
– For i = 1, . . . ,q, where q is polynomial in n, D chooses
xi ∈ {0, 1}m1 and sends it to the challenger.
– If b = 0, the challenger replies with F (s,xi ). Otherwise,
if xi has not been queried before, the challenger picks
yi ∈ {0, 1}m2 uniformly at random and sends it to 𝒜 . If
xi has been queried previously, the challenger sends the
same response as the last time xi was queried.
– 𝒜 outputs b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b∗ = b.
Definition A.3. IND-CCA security
An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc,Dec) is said to be IND-CCA
secure if any PPT adversary 𝒜 is successful in the following game
with the probability at most 12 +neдl(n), whereneдl(·) is a negligible
function:
• The challenger generates keys (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ).
• 𝒜 receives pk as input.
• 𝒜 gets a black-box access to Decsk (·).
• 𝒜 chooses x0,x1.
• The challenger chooses b ← {0, 1} at random and gives 𝒜
the challenge ciphertext c = Encpk (xb ).
• 𝒜 ’s access to Decsk (·) is now restricted - 𝒜 is not allowed
to ask for the decryption of c .
• 𝒜 outputs b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
Note that authenticated encryption implies single-message IND-
CCA security, and single-message IND-CCA security implies multi-
message IND-CCA security.
Finally, we are using the random oracle model where all parties
have access to a random oracle, which is defined as follows:
Definition A.4. Random oracle
Given a security parameter n and a length function lout (·), a
random oracle R is a map from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}lout (n).
A.2 Proof of Access Sequence
Indistinguishability
We provide a security proof for Talek’s protocol by reduction to
the cryptographic assumptions provided in Appendix A.1. Defi-
nitions of RealWrite and FakeWrite are provided in §5.3. RealRead,
FakeRead are defined in §5.4. Finally, interest vectors (addressed in
Game 4) are defined in §7 .
We consider a series of games adapted from the game in §3.2,
each defined from the previous one by idealizing some part of the
protocol. For game i , we write pi for the maximum advantage,
|Pr (b = b ′) − 1/2|, that 𝒜 holds in the security game. At each
step, we bound the adversary’s advantage between two successive
games. Technically, each of the following games consists of a series
of hybrid games, where we change each of them clients one by
one.
Game 0: This is the original game defined in §3.2 with an adversary
𝒜 that choosesm challenger clients, and submits sequences with
α0 calls to RealRead, and α1 calls to RealWrite, using the protocol
defined in the paper. All RealReads and FakeReads from the client
trigger ProcessRead on the servers. All RealWrites and FakeWrites
from the client trigger ProcessWrite on the servers. Thus, the ad-
versary has control over the messages sent by the clients over the
network. We intend to show that the adversary’s advantage in this
game is negligible.
Game 1: (PIR Read) This game is as above, except that in each
RealRead(τ , seqNo), we replace the real read location (specifically
the bucket PRF (τ .k, seqNo)) by the index of an arbitrary bucket, as
specified in FakeRead. Let ϵP IR (λ0,n) bound the advantage of an
adversary breaking the PIR assumption in n calls to PIR read (via
RealRead) with security parameter λ0.
Given an adversary 𝒢 that distinguishes between Game 0 and
Game 1 and makes n calls to RealRead, we can construct an adver-
sary𝒫 on the security of the n-round PIR scheme.𝒫 starts by
sending the set of indices of the servers, controlled by 𝒢 to its own
challenger 𝒞P . Then,𝒫 behaves like a challenger to 𝒢 , following
the description of the access sequence indistinguishability game,
except for the case where a read request must be issued and the
read queue is not empty (thus, a RealRead(τ , seqNo) is executed).
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In this case,𝒫 computes i := PRF (τ .k, seqNo), where k is equal to
ks1 or ks2, depending on whether the first or the second cuckoo
location must be read;𝒫 also chooses j at random in [0..b − 1].
Then,𝒫 forwards i and j to 𝒞P . Upon receiving the l − 1 PIR re-
quest queries from its challenger in response,𝒫 forwards these
to 𝒢 . Upon 𝒢 ending the game,𝒫 responds to its own challenger
𝒞P with i , if 𝒢 ’s response was Game 0, and j, if 𝒢 ’s response was
Game 1. Note that i corresponds to the real location specified by
the RealRead request, whereas j is sampled at random, as defined
by FakeRead . Thus, if 𝒞P chooses index i , then the game 𝒢 is in is
exactly Game 0, and if 𝒞P chooses index j, then the game 𝒢 is in
is exactly Game 1. Since the adversary makes α0 calls to RealRead ,
we get:
p0 ≤ p1 +m · ϵP IR (λ0,α0)
Game 2: (IND-CCA with Write) This game is as above, except
that RealWrite is modified to encrypt a dummy message instead of
seqNo |M .
Let ϵAEIND−CCA(λ1,n) be the advantage of an adversary who
breaks the IND-CCA assumption and performs n calls to RealWrite
with security parameter λ1.
Given an adversary 𝒢 that distinguishes between Game 1 and
Game 2 and makes n calls to RealWrite, we can construct an adver-
sary𝒫 on the n-message IND-CCA security of the used encryption
scheme.𝒫 behaves like a challenger to 𝒢 , following the descrip-
tion of the access sequence indistinguishability game, except for
the case where a write request must be issued and the write queue
is not empty (thus, a RealWrite(τ , seqNo,M) is executed). In this
case,𝒫 generates a random messageM∗ with the same length as
seqNo |M . Then,𝒫 forwards seqNo |M andM∗ to 𝒞P . Upon receiv-
ing the challenge ciphertext c in response,𝒫 forwards β1 |β2 |c to 𝒢 ,
where β1 and β2 are the numbers of the buckets as specified by the
Write request. Upon 𝒢 ending the game,𝒫 responds to its own
challenger 𝒞P with 0 (meaning the challenge was an encryption of
seqNo |M), if 𝒢 ’s response was Game 1, and 1, if 𝒢 ’s response was
Game 2 (meaning the challenge was an encryption of M∗). Note
that if 𝒞P chooses seqNo |M , then the game 𝒢 is in is exactlyGame
1, and if 𝒞P choosesM∗, then the game 𝒢 is in is exactly Game 2.
Since the adversary makes α1 calls to RealWrite , we can apply the
IND-CCA definition and get:
p1 ≤ p2 +m · ϵAEIND−CCA(λ1,α1)
Game3: (PRFwithWrite)This game is as above, except we replace
the PRF used to generate the bucket locations of RealWrites with a
truly random function, such that the client submits a FakeWrite. Let
ϵPRFdist inдuish (λ2,n) bound the advantage of an adversary breaking
the PRF assumption after n calls to the PRF with a security parame-
ter λ2. Technically, this game consists of a series of up to 2n games:
two for each log handle used in a write request. In the following,
we describe the game for replacing the PRF used in the generation
of β1.
Given an adversary 𝒢 that distinguishes between Game 2 and
Game 3 and makes n calls to RealWrite, we can construct an ad-
versary𝒫 on the security of the used PRF that is called up to n
times.𝒫 behaves like a challenger to 𝒢 , following the description
of the access sequence indistinguishability game, except for the
case where a write request must be issued and the write queue
is not empty (thus, a RealWrite(τ , seqNo,M) is executed). In this
case,𝒫 forwards seqNo to 𝒞P . Upon receiving the challenge β in
response,𝒫 uses it instead of β1 in the generated Write request
and forwards the request to 𝒢 (note that exactly the same proce-
dure can be done for β2). Upon 𝒢 ending the game,𝒫 responds
to its own challenger 𝒞P with PRF , if 𝒢 ’s response was Game 2,
and Random function, if 𝒢 ’s response was Game 3. Note that if 𝒞P
chooses to use the PRF on the provided input, then the game 𝒢 is
in is exactly Game 2, and if 𝒞P chooses to use a random function,
then the game 𝒢 is in is exactlyGame 3. Since the adversary makes
α1 calls to RealWrite and each of these calls contains two calls to
the PRF, we conclude:
p2 ≤ p3 + 2 ·m · ϵPRFdist inдuish (λ2,α1)
Game 4: (Hash functions in interest vectors) This game is as
above, except we replace the h cryptographic hash functions used
in the Bloom filter of the interest vector with queries to a random
oracle. Technically, this game consists of a series of hybrid games,
where we change each of the h hash function one by one. Let
ϵhash (λ3,n) bound the advantage of an adversary breaking the
random oracle assumption in n calls with a security parameter, λ3.
Given an adversary 𝒢 that distinguishes between Game 3 and
Game 4 and makes n calls to RealWrite, we can construct an adver-
sary𝒫 on the random oracle assumption that is calledn times. First,
𝒫 chooses n log IDs at random.𝒫 behaves like a challenger to 𝒢 ,
following the description of the access sequence indistinguishabil-
ity game, except for the case where a write request must be issued
and the write queue is not empty (thus, a RealWrite(τ , seqNo,M)
is executed). In this case,𝒫 selects one of the n log IDs chosen
in the beginning (using the same log id if the log handle has been
used in a RealWrite before) and forwards it to 𝒞P . The Write is
then generated by 𝒞P as specified in the previous game, except that
the generation of the interest vector submitted with this request is
changed. The interest vector is generated as specified in the previ-
ous game, except for the hash function in question. The position in
the interest vector defined by this hash function is defined by the
challenge received from 𝒞P . Upon receiving this challenge pos ,𝒫
puts a 1 in the position pos of the interest vector of the generated
Write request and forwards the request to 𝒢 . Upon 𝒢 ending the
game,𝒫 responds to its own challenger 𝒞P with Hash function, if
𝒢 ’s response was Game 3, and it responds with Random oracle, if
𝒢 ’s response was Game 4. Note that if 𝒞P chooses to use the hash
function on the input provided, then the game 𝒢 is in is exactly
Game 3, and if 𝒞P chooses to use a random oracle, then the game
𝒢 is in is exactly Game 4. Since the adversary makes α1 calls to
RealWrite, and each of these calls contains one call to each of the h
cryptographic hash functions, we conclude:
p3 ≤ p4 +m · h · ϵhash (λ3,α1)
From this final game, all of the parameters in any network request
have been replaced with random values. Because Game 4 involves
all clients issuing periodic requests with random parameters, by
definition the adversary’s advantage, p4, must be negligible.
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Privacy: Collecting the probabilities from all games yields:
p0 ≤m · ϵP IR (λ0,α0)+
m · ϵAEIND−CPA(λ1,α1)+
2 ·m · ϵPRFdist inдuish (λ2,α1)+
m · h · ϵhash (λ3,α1)
p0 becomes negligible for large security parameters λ0, λ1, λ2, and
λ3.
Proof of Security for Serialized PIR. We provide intuition for the
security of the serialized PIR introduced in §6 by reduction to the
security of the underlying PIR system discussed in §2, and the
cryptographic assumptions of the cryptographic primitives used.
First, becausewe use authenticated encryption, sending encryptions
of the seed pi and PIR request values qi for each server i through
the lead server is as secure as sending values pi , qi to server i
directly through authenticated secure communication channels.
Next, because of the security of the PRNG scheme, sending values
pi and computing Pi = PRNG(pi ) on the server side is comparable
to the security of the client generating random bit vectors Pi and
sending those to the servers instead. Finally, because at this point
vectors Pi are randomly generated and can be viewed as a one-time
pad, computing responses Ri and sending values Ri ⊕ Pi to the
lead server is as secure as computing and sending responses Ri to
the client directly. At this point, the modified protocol corresponds
exactly to the original version discussed in §2.
B PSEUDOCODE
{
logID: uint128 ,
seed1: uint128 ,
seed2: uint128 ,
encKey: byte[]
}
(a) Log Handle
Encrypt ({
logId: uint128 ,
seqNo: uint64 ,
value: byte[],
signature: byte[],
}, encKey)
(b) Message Payload
Figure 13: Schema of the log handle and a message payload. The log handle
is a shared secret between a trusted group of users, used to reconstitute a
log from the servers. Each message payload in the log is encrypted with a
shared encryption key.
17
, , Raymond Cheng, William Scott, Elisaweta Masserova, Irene Zhang, Vipul Goyal, Thomas Anderson, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Bryan Parno
//GlobalState
дlobalLoд ← Array() ▷ Global log of write operations
seqNo ← 0 ▷ Global sequence number
hashtable ← BlockedCuckoo(b, d ) ▷ b buckets of depth d
1: //Writes the data into one of two buckets
2: functionWrite(buckets ,data,interestV ec )
3: if isLeader () then
4: seqNo ← seqNo + 1
5: Append operation to дlobalLoд
6: Forward operation to follower servers with seqNo
7: else
8: Insert operation into дlobalLoд at given seqNo
9: end if
10: Remove n-th oldest element from hashtable
11: hashtable .inser t (buckets[0], buckets[1], data)
12: end function
1: //Performs a PIR-based read
2: function Read(bucketV ector )
3: return bucketV ector · hashtable
4: end function
1: //Returns the global interest vector
2: function GetUpdates
3: v ← BloomFilter ()
4: for all e ∈ last n elements of дlobalLoд do
5: v ← v ∪ e .interestV ec
6: end for
7: return v
8: end function
Figure 14: Pseudocode for server-side RPC handlers (NPI). The NPI was designed such that the parameters for any operation reveal no information about the
user’s application usage. Writes are serialized by the leader and replicated in global order to the follower servers (§6). When writing, clients explicitly specify
the two potential hash table buckets into which data is inserted. When data is read using a PIR protocol, we expose a blocked cuckoo hash table with the n
most recent messages in the log and return full buckets. For simplicity, we only describe the original IT-PIR algorithm, which we show (in §A.2) is equivalent
to the serialized PIR algorithm described in §6.
//GlobalState
loдs ← Map() ▷ Latest sequence numbers seen for each log
r eadQueue ← Queue()
writeQueue ← Queue()
1: function Publish(loд,messaдe )
2: Enqueue operation towriteQueue
3: end function
1: function Subscribe(loд)
2: Add loд to loдs
3: end function
1: function PeriodicWrite
2: if writeQueue .isEmpty() then
3: Send a random write request to the leader
4: else
5: loд, data ← writeQueue .dequeue()
6: seqNo ← loдs[t .id ]++
7: bucket1← PRF (t .seed1, seqNo)
8: bucket2← PRF (t .seed2, seqNo)
9: data′ ← Encloд .key (data)
10: intV ec ← BloomFilter ()
11: intV ec .inser t (loд .id |seqNo)
12: leader .Write([bucket1, bucket2], data′, intV ec)
13: end if
14: end function
1: function PeriodicRead
2: if r eadQueue .isEmpty() then
3: Generate a random read request to each server
4: else
5: loд, seqNo, seedChoice ← r eadQueue .dequeue()
6: seed ← (seedChoice == 1)?loд .seed1 : loд .seed2
7: data, queryl , query′ ← [0 . . . 0] ▷ init to zero
8: query′[PRF (seed, seqNo)] ← 1 ▷ secret
9: for each server in followers do
10: query ← RandomBitStr inд(numBuckets)
11: data ← data⊕ server .Read (query)
12: queryl ← queryl
⊕
query
13: end for
14: queryl ← queryl
⊕
query′
15: data ← data⊕ leader .Read (queryl )
16: if data contains (loд, seqNo) then
17: return data
18: else if seedChoice == 1 then
19: Enqueue a read for (loд, seqNo, 2) to r eadQueue
20: end if
21: end if
22: end function
1: function PeriodicUpdates
2: дlobal IntV ec ← leader .GetUpdates()
3: for all loд ∈ loдs do
4: seqNo ← loдs[loд .id ]
5: if дlobal IntV ec .contains(loд .id, seqNo) then
6: Enqueue a read for (loд, seqNo, 1) to r eadQueue
7: end if
8: end for
9: end function
Figure 15: Pseudocode for the Talek client library. Calls to publish and subscribe are queued in a global request queue. A periodic process either issues a
random request or dequeues a legitimate operation to be translated into a privacy-preserving NPI request. Messages in a log are written deterministically to
random buckets. Subscribers use PIR to retrieve these messages. The code above uses serialized PIR (§6).
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